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SPEECH 

OF 

-I 

s 

HON. WILLIAM J. FLAGG, 



OF HAMILTON COUNTY, f^ ' 



DELIVERED IN THE 



OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



ON THE RESOLUTION OF 



MR. WEST TO EXPEL HON. OTTO DEESEL, 



MARCH 25, 1863 



BOSTON: 
PREISS OF THE DAILY COURIER. 

1863, 






l\\ exchange 
^AR 2 9 191B 



SPEECH. 



Mr. Speaker: Now I have obtained the 
floor, I hardly know why I rose. I have really 
no right in a debate like this. I belong neither 
with those who voted for the resolutions offered 
by Mr. Dresel, nor with those who would expel 
him or inflict on him the formal censure of this 
body for off'ering them. I am of neither house, 
being merely a poor friend of the Union, who 
tries to do his duty, in a quiet way, to the State 
and to the cause, with no taste for party bicker- 
ings in times like these. 

Mr. Dresel's proposed resolutions were bad, 
bitter bad ; not so much so in their statements 
(which contain, with a good deal that is errone- 
ous, a good deal that is true), as in the serpent- 
like element of evil which lurks in them, and 
the connection in which they were off"ered. But 
there is a right of free debate sacred to freemen 
in all conditions of life (and which invests with 
special sanctity the person of a representative 
of freemen), that we may not rashly tamper 
with. It is guaranteed by and overshadowed 
with that great principle of our Constitution 
which declares that error, falsehood, and malice, 
even treasonable error, falsehood, and malice, 
so long as they take no more solid shape than 
the breath of man, shall be protected in their 
airy utterance ; the consequence of which great 
principle has been, that, until about these 
days all treasonable ideas hatched by discontent 
in the minds of our people have blown themselves 
harmlessly away. And in tolerating evil propo- 
sitions uttered in free debate, we are but assert- 
ing our faith in the power of our free system to 
bear assaults which the boasted strength of 
thrones dare not encounter. 

Is factious opposition to the Government so 
rare now, that we should specially single out Mr. 
Otto Dresel to make an example of ? Has the 
national House of Representatives censured 



Representative Conway for standing on its floor 
and proposing submission to the rebels and a 
dissolution of the Union ? Has it disciplined 
Stevens, who in his place declared against a 
restoration of the Union, though at the same 
time avowing his willingness to accept a Union 
— another Union — but not the Union which 
was, and is, and, by God's help, is to be ? Or 
were the portals of the national Senate closed 
against Trumbull, who dared to give thanks for 
the defeat of our arms ? 

Why, sir, most of the opposition to the Gov- 
ernment in its conduct of the war, and by far 
the most clamorous and factious, as well as most 
effective and disastrous opposition, has come, 
not from that party whose province it in some 
sort was to oppose and criticise, but has come 
from the bosom of the Republican party itself, 
whose duty it was to aid, defend and encourage. 
I must say of the Democrats, that, on the whole, 
and especially until within eight months past, 
and until after a policy was adopted and things 
were done which might provoke a very saint to 
be factious, they have dealt far more gently with 
the Government than it had a right to expect. 
And even now, this very day, and here in this 
city, their chief men in council have resolved to 
retrace some of their hasty steps, and render as 
hearty a support to the war as they did 
at first. Is not this a cause of rejoicing? 
Is not their aid valuable to the cause ? 
Is this a moment for an acrimonious measure 
like the one before us to* be adopted- 
initiated, too, by the gentleman from Logan, 
Mr. West, who but the other day actually im- 
plored Democratic leaders to abate their oppo- 
sition, and not forsake the country, for, said he, 
" if they do forsake it, we are lost ?" 

Sir, I believe that the rebellion would have 
been suppressed before the last fourth of July, 



but for a factious opposition to the war policy 
of the Government, made by the radical element 
of the party which raised that Government to 
power. Sustained as the President was by the 
people at large, with their whole wealth and 
strength, there was no problem in the business 
of conquering the armies of the traitors, cap- 
turing their holds, and sweeping with our free 
battalions over every acre of disloyal soil, which 
military skill of a very moderate kind might 
not easily have solved. It was simply a 
question of numbers, equipment, and time. 
The numbers were given ; the means of equip- 
ment were given ; the time was at our disposal. 
At once the true instincts of the masses realized 
this to be a massive war, and tendered in one 
month half a million of men. In Ohio alone, 
the offerings of the first three weeks were eighty- 
one thousand. But they were refused, and only 
seventy-five thousand reluctantly, doubtingly 
accepted. The seventy-five thousand failed to 
conquer the rebellion ; they only encouraged 
and inflamed it. 

The fault was the fault, not of the brave, 
willing people, but of a party. Our arms 
failed, and our cause failed, that a partisan dog- 
ma might stand. And what was that dogma ? 
With the radical or abolitionist element of the 
Republican organization it was from the first 
an article of faith, to doubt which was to be ex- 
communicated, that the Southern people were 
cowardly and weak, just as with the fire-eaters 
of the cotton States it was an article of faith 
that the Northern people were but a contempti- 
ble race, any ten of whom a Mississippi or 
Georgia ruffian might hack to pieces with his 
steel toothpick. And this silly no- 
tion, that radical element was actually 
able, so far to infuse into the minds of 
the whole Republican party, that the Pres- 
ident and Cabinet adopted it, and acted 
on it. It so beclouded the judgment of the 
Congress which assembled on the 4th of July, 
1861, that they could see in the well-equipped 
and disciplined army, which then held a natural- 
ly strong and strongly intrenched position at 
Manassas Junction only a pusillanimous rebel 
rout, which the advance of our own armed mob 
of raw recruits, which General Scott was doing 
his best to organize — and that he might do it, 
was imploring for time — would be sure to scat- 
ter like sheep. They proved this their faith by 
their works ; for on the eve of the battle Con- 
gress adjourned wid went out tc view the sport 



with the placid dignity of grave Spaniards 
going to see a bull-fight— they saw a bull-run ! 
Strange to say, the lesson thus taken lasted 
only a few months, and has had to be frequently 
repeated, as we shall see. The stern teachings 
of disaster have, however, at length availed to 
bring our rulers to realize the need which the 
instincts of the people realized from the first, 
and which I, but an humble member of the 
Ohio Legislature, realized as early as April, 
1861, when, just where I now stand, I declared 
for accepting half a million volunteers while 
the spirit of volunteering was up, drilling and 
equipping them during summer and fall, and 
then marching them southward with the march 
of the frosts of early winter, trampling out the 
rebellion as they went. But the wise Cabinet 
council could not see this until the guns of 
Manassas blew open their eyelids, nor until 
the enthusiasm for enlisting had so sub- 
sided that midwinter found our forces 
in the field still far below the desired number, 
and they, in large part, badly armed. 

It was not long afterwards, and soon after our 
successes in the Southwest had turned the 
heads of the Congressional •* Committee on the 
Conduct of the War," that the baleful fallacy I 
have named — 

The "habit very blamable, which is 
That of despising ihose we combat with," 

again resumed its sway. Well knowing how 
quickly large armies will waste away, and well 
knowing, too, that a united people is stronger 
than a divided one, yet, deluding themselves 
with the notion that the rebellion was over, and 
the need of Democratic assistance had passed 
by, the placard was everywhere set up — 

" NO MORE RECRUITS RECEIVED, AND NO DEM- 
OCRATS WANTED." 

But I must keep myself in order, and speak 
to the question. I said factious opposition 
to the war policy of the Government had of late 
been too common for us to select the case of 
Otto Dresel as so peculiarly bad, that we must 
deal with it in the extraordinary mode proposed. 

The war policy of the Executive was clearly 
announced in the Crittenden resolution. That 
policy was a good one. It united the North, 
and divided the South. It saved three great 
States to the Union. It headed the muster-roll 
of seven hundred thousand men. More than 
this, it was a compact, to which our rulers were 
pledged and bound in faith and honor, as by 
oath and bond. A few in the Republican party 



— a few, but a fiery-hearted, positive, restless, 
propagandizing few — resolved to break up this 
beneficent policy, come what might. They did 
not scruple to choose a time of national trial 
and trouble to do this. A constituent portion 
of the Republican organization took upon itself 
to play the part of an opposition. A party was 
organized within a party. A conspiracy was 
formed within the Capitol and the War Office. 

At this time the Commander-in-Chief was 
one George B. McClellan, a quiet, reticent man, 
with no politics to speak of, save devotion to 
the Union, and a desire to be useful in restoring 
it by conquering the armies of its assailants. 
But, unfortunately, he had in Western Virginia 
proclaimed that servile insurrection within his 
department would be "put down with an iron 
hand." He must be removed, by fair means or 
foul. By fair means or foul the war policy must 
be changed, and the Commander-in-Chief dis- 
placed. 

The game began. Congress laid by war meas- 
ures and revenue measures, and organized itself 
into an Abolition debating society. The rebels 
were building Merrimacs, but a bill for con- 
structing iron-clads was delayed two or three 
months, that Representatives from the loyal 
slave States might be baited and goaded, even 
as bulls were baited in a circus. The credit of 
the treasury was failing, because Republican 
papers reiterated the falsehood that o 'r expen- 
ditures were four millions a day, and yet neces- 
sary revenue bills lay unnoticed on the table. 
Generals were laboring to make the new recruits 
submit to drill and discipline ; the press, the 
Senate, and even the War Office, derided their 
efforts, and told the recruits that nothing was 
needed to make them invincible but a policy, no 
tactics of any value but the art of robbing rebel 
hen-roosts, and no ^'esprit du corps" but the 
Spirit of God. Our victories were belittled, and 
our reverses magnified. The popular impatience 
was played upon till it was worked into a furor. 
It was "Forward to Richmond !" "Forward to 
Manassas !" "Forward to the Shenandoah !" 
"Forward anywhere and everywhere !" They 
would see no impediment in trench, abattis, or 
parapet, nor any guns but Quaker guns, nor 
any enemies but cowards, few, ill fed and clad 
and poorly armed. 

A committee on the conduct of the war was 
organized, whose special function it was to find 
fault with, hamper and impede — not the enemv, 
but the Government of their country ! In the 



sound of their clamor the voice of Vallandigham 
sunk out of hearing. 

Republican Congressmen and Republican 
journals should have sustained the Government 
— should have encouraged th-j people — should 
have taught patience under delays and cheerlul- 
ness under reverses — should have excused faults, 
hidden weaknesses, and promised victory — 
should have acted like the Whigs in the Revo- 
lution, Democrats in the war of 1812, and Dem- 
ocrats in the Mexican war ; instead of which 
they acted more like Tories in the Revolution, 
Federalists in the war of 1812, and infinitely 
worse than Whigs in the Mexican war. 

What right had such a faction to hope for 
success before the people ? They ruled their 
party in the end, but they ruined it too. They 
invaded the War Office and White House ; but 
a Congress of men, quite other than they, stands 
at the gates of the Capitol. But, worse than 
this, they robbed our armies of victory — they 
brought defeat and disgrace on our flag — and 
the blood of an hundred thousand brave, true 
men is red upon their foreheads. 

I will now prove this : I will prove that the 
ascendancy of the radicals, under Wade and 
Chandler, has alone saved the rebels from ruin, 
while it has well nigh ruined us. 

To begin earlier than the appearance of McClel- ' 
Ian at the head of the army. In the outbreak of 
the rebellion, Missouri was more loyal than 
Kentucky, more easily held than Kentucky, if 
disloyal, and more easily managed, by jiolicy, if 
neutral. General Harney, in command there, 
had already quieted the feverish pulse of his fel- 
low Missourians. There was good ground to 
believe he would have saved all the blood after- 
wards shed west of tne Mississippi, had he con- 
tinued in that command. But, on the pretence 
of disloyalty, he was displaced, and to this day 
remains without a command. Able and veteran 
General as he is — driven into oblivion, while 
others are reaping fame — disgraced, so far as it 
is poss ble for injustice to disgrace a true man — 
robbed of the right to prove his loyalty by 
meeting death in the field, he has been forced to 
prove it by his life; living down the calumny in 
retirement and obscurity. Who believes to-day 
that Harney is a traitor ? Who but knows he 
was robbed of a sdldi.^r's right because he was c 
slaveholder, and ioved the Union without 
amendment or alteration ? 

Fremont, the idol of a party, was, ere long, 
put in Harney's place, that he m'ght gain sue- 



cesses which would justify the transferrin » him 
to the command of the Army of the Potomac. 
He found things in a bad condition, ana soon 
made them worse. He so energetically compli- 
cated, overset and bewildered things — so dash- 
ingly, headlessly and heedlessly bejumbled and 
perplexed the campaign, that history can never 
unravel its order and sequence, nor all the 
Auditors of the Treasury ever untangle 
his accounts. He was recalled. A crowd of 
swindlers were prosecuted for imposing upon 
his innocent and unsuspecting nature, and a 
special commission sent out to jump at his ac- 
counts. 

McClellan now comes up. I am here called 
to order because I name him. I know you can- 
not bear to hear his name. But it will haunt 
you till you die, and his fame, filling the air 
around you, will be inhaled with your latest 
breath. His name is history ; it is power ; it 
is worth to the cause an army complete in artil- 
lery, infantry, and cavalry. Hurrah for McClel- 
lan ! In persistent refusal to accept volunteers 
who by tens and hundreds of thousands every- 
where offered themselves — in the Congressional 
folly of Bull Run — in the subsequent effort to 
obtain reluctant recruits — the spring, summer, 
and most of the fall passed away. In making 
an army the winter was improved. From No- 
vember 1st till March 11th McClellan held ab- 
solute command, except in Fremont's depart- 
ment. During that four months and eleven 
days we had victory everywhere and disaster no- 
where, save only Fremont's blunder of Belmont, 
which was in a department where McClellan 
had no control. Disaster nowhere and victory 
everywhere during the whole term of his chief 
command ! Is the statement plain, simple, and 
easy to remember ? 

And the victories of that four months and 
eleven days, with' the victories of the entire 
spring of 1862, wf-re won because we were 
everywhere found stroi.- f^nough to cope with 
the enemy. They were as Ifj^it/mately the fruits 
of preparation as the apple is the fruit of the 
tree. And the tide turn (' ^s:ainst us only after 
that preparation had meae.: :My worn out, in 
consequence of the wasteful usu ,:-d foolish dis- 
persion of the army, and the refusal to recruit 
its ranks. 

All knew it was McCIellan's plan to prepare a 
great and overwhelming army, and move upon 
the rebels, East and West, as nearly as might 
be at the same point of time — that he intend- 



ed the movement should not begin until the 
season should permit of immediately following 
up successes, and that so rapidly no time should 
be allowed the rebels to recover from his blows; 
and all know that in the spring of 1862, the 
rebel forces were far inferior to ours, both East 
and West, particularly at the West, and that it 
was only in consequence of the pressure of their 
great reverses then received that the Southern 
people could be made to submit to a conscrip- 
tion, which brought in the fresh troops who 
drove us from the Peninsula ; drove us across 
the borders of Pennsylvania ; drove us up to 
the gates of Cincinnati. 

McClellan, furthermore, being a soldier and 
a man of business, relying on the best modern 
improved arms, and not on the Sword of Gideon 
— a student of the Art of War, and not wholly 
relying on the inspiration of the Spirit of God 
had his own views of the time needed to make 
a complete soldier out of a green volunteer; not 
believing, as Congressional warriors do, that 
there is no Art of War, or at least none but 
what every new-born baby has when it tumbles 
naked and squalling into this world of strife. 
He had his own opinion, too, and not the Con- 
gressional or newspaper opinion, as to where 
and how to strike a blow at the mortal part of 
the rebellion. 

It will surprise my friend from Ashtabula, 
Mr. Krum, who here asks my opinion of the 
campaign against Manassas and the Quaker 
guns, to learn that a march to Manassas was 
never in the General's plan, and was made sorely 
against his own will, to gratify Congressmen, 
whom those guns had frightened out of their 
wits. 

The first serious onset upon the Commander- 
in-Chief was made soon after the meeting of 
Congress in December, 1861. At this time, and 
for the three months following, our army was 
recruiting at the rate of two thousand men a 
day, while its daily growth in efficiency, through 
drill and equipment, was fully equal to another 
one thousand. Every day saw, also, the ad- 
dition of one gunboat to our navy. The 
time was not lost ; it was gained. The army 
was not idle ; it was busy. That of thePo'omac 
was so thoroughly exercised, that at the end of 
six months it had reached a pitch of discipline 
equal to that of Wellington's after three years 
of practice, ami, like that of Wellington, was 
fit and able to "go anywhere and do anything." 
The army of Buel, too, was being brought to 



that point of efficiency which afterwards enabled 
them coolly to march with fixed bayonets 
through ten thousand of Grant's fugitives, cow- 
ering under the river bank at Pittsburg Land- 
ing, and turn the defeat of Shiloh into a vic- 
tory. 

Yet, during all those three months, the cabal 
of conspirators were filling the air with their 
clamor against delay. Every moment improved 
by the General to create his armies, they im- 
proved to destroy him, and demoralize both 
army and people. 

He was slow, they said. He was a coward — 
a fool — a traitor. The ordinary exercises by 
which alone an army can be perfected and in- 
spired with "esprit du corps," were sneered at as 
futile, ridiculous shows. Carping and jeering 
were the means where falsehoods failed. Mud 
was an inexhaustible material for witticisms. 
"Grand reviews" and "the quiet of the Poto- 
mac" were jokes some people never tired of 
laughing at. Telegraph and mail buzzed and 
groaned with their load of lies. 

A year has gone by. The people have seen a 
General with his army, abandoned by its Gov- 
ernment, fight their way out of the jaws of death, 
and out of the gates of hell. They have seen 
that army, after being bereft of their chief, and 
demoralized by defeat and ill management, re- 
ceive back that chief, whom a terror-struck cab- 
inet restored to them, and become, with a shout, 
the Army of the Potomac again. They have 
heard of South Mountain, and of the salvation 
at Antietam. And who is there will dare tell 
them now that McClellan is a fool, a coward, or 
a traitor? Even those who believe that Pope 
was a better General than he, or Burnside bet- 
ter than both, or Hooker better than the three, 
or Fremont worth them all together — or think 
they believe it — must own that one year ago 
there was a vast amount of lying of one sort or 
another done at Washington, and believed 
through the country. 

Never was viler conspiracy hatched before. 
At its head, chosen for his peculiar qualities as 
a bull-dog to take the President by the throat, 
armed with authority on behalf of his faction to 
threaten any measure of opposition he pleased, 
was the man whom this Legislature has but 
lately chosen for Senator, to represent the loy- 
alty of Ohio. 

Again, who believes to-day that the rebel 
army of Virginia was a flock of timid sheep, 
afflicted mostly with the rot, and armed only 



with Quaker guns ? Yet to believe this, with 
the rest, was one short year ago the test of 
loyalty. 

Up to the moment when the General-in-Chief 
went to Harper's Ferry to see Banks, with his 
force of thirty thousand strong, cross the river 
and enter the Shenandoah Valley, as preliminary 
to the movement of the main body of the Army 
of the Potomac, by water, to attack Richmond 
by way of the James and York rivers and the 
Peninsula, the effort to shake the President's 
faith in his chosen commander had seemingly 
failed. In the three or four days' absence this 
trip required, the Committee on the Conduct of 
the War and the Secretary of War measurably 
succeeded in their purpose, so that on his re- 
turn McClellan was coldly received, and inform- 
ed that his plan of campaign, which it had been 
promised him he should be allowed to follow, 
would not do ; that the handful of rebels and 
quaker guns at Manassas were too formidable 
for the large army he proposed to leave in and 
about the strong forts that protected Washing- 
ton, and that he must march straight out to 
Manassas with his whole force, or a Congres- 
sional committee would surely faint. He 
marched on Manassas early the next morning, 
to find empty works and wooden guns. 

It seems that although the Congressional 
Committee failed to appreciate the strategy of 
the General they chose to despise, the enemy 
had not. Learning from the vast fleet of trans- 
ports which had since the middle of February 
whitened river and bay, that McClellan would 
decline their invitation to fight them just where 
they wanted him to fight them, before their 
strong works and in their chosen position, and 
would go to Richmond his own way — or else 
learning his plans from a leak in the Cabinet 
(for the rebels boast they knew it in Richmond 
only forty-eight hours after the Cabinet forced 
h-L-ii to tell it) — learning this, the enemy had 
been for weeks quietly evacuating Manassas, 
and falling back on Richmond. With Banks 
and thirty thousand within co-operating distance, 
and with the larger force left in front of Wash- 
ington, one would have thought that our Con- 
gressional heroes could have kept up courage 
while an army, of a hundred and fifty thousand 
men or more went to keep the rebels busy in 
another direction. 

So you see the march to Manassas was not 
McClellan's, but was a campaign made for the 
sole benefit and at the express command of the 



8 



" conductors of the war." And now, my Aah- . 
tabula friend, laugh at Generals Wade, Stanton 
and Chandler till your sides shake. Manassas 
was taken by strategy, without firing a gun, as 
Norfolk was afterwards taken, by the same skil- 
ful hand ; but Manassas was not taken by that 
celebrated onset upon timber columbiads in 
empty forts. 

A fortnight or more was lost in this foolery — 
a precious fortnight for us to lose, as for the 
rebels to gain. Permission was graciously given 
McClellan to go his own way to work. And he 
did. Two-thirds of the army being landed on 
the Peninsula, its progress began. In as short 
a time as the transportation could be effected, 
those two-thirds begin the march against York- 
town, which must be taken by siege, as such 
fortifications are usually taken. In conducting 
the siege, a delay of one month occurs, during 
which the conspirators develop a disgust for 
spades. Yorktown is taken, and the march on 
Richmond commences. About a hundred thou- 
sand men are on the march. But where is the 
corps of McDowell, part and parcel of the Army 
of the Potomac, that was to follow immediately 
on the leturn of the transports ? It is withheld 
by a countermand of orders, but it is promised 
it shall soon advance and be in at the death. 
With that corps, the fall of Richmond is cer- 
tain ; without it, the question is getting doubt- 
ful. The Navy Department has not fulfilled its 
contract to look after James River, and the 
rebels are making the best use of their time to 
bring in conscripts and fortify the city. Mc- 
Clellan is before Richmond, Fair Oaks 
proves the fighting quality of our men 
and the desperation of the rebels. They had 
sent out Stonewall Jackson with instructions 
that " he can best serve the interests of the 
Confederacy by keeping reinforcements from 
McClellan." The instiuclions fall into the hands 
of the Conduct of the War Committee, and 
they " serve those interests " better than even 
Jackson could, though he does pretty well with 
his fifteen or twenty thousand, flitting up and 
down the valley, keeping four times his numbers 
busy at hide and-seek. 

The baltle of Hanover Court House was 
fought, and two lines of railway cut, to prepare 
for the reception of the rest of the Army of the 
Potomac. Where are they? They belong to 
the array as much as a limb belongs to the body. 
They were raised, drilled and inspirited by the 
General they loved, to do this very business, 



now ready to be done — the taking of Richmond. 
McClellan has hopefully reached out his right 
hand, and is now anxiously feeling for that of 
McDowell. Where is McDowell ? The enemy 
are growing strong. We are falling sick. De- 
lay is death and ruin. We are all across the 
Ghickahominy — all but McDowell ! 

Where is McDowell ? Send down him and 
his forty-thousand, and we will soon ring you a 
Yankee-doodle from Richmond steeples, now 
full in view. If no McDowell, then, for the 
Union's sake, no Stonewell Jackson ! If you 
cannot, War Committee, send us McDowell, 
at the least let not Stonewall fall upon us ! 

The Committee tied up McDowell ! — they let 
loose Jackson ! God help McClellan ! — God 
help the grand Army of the Potomac! — God 
help the Union ! 

Sold, sold and delivered to the Ishmaelites ! 
Our army cut in twain ! Our enemy doubled ! 

They fall upon our flank — fall upon it 
like wolves sure of their prey — a week of 
blood — seven days and seven pitched battles ! 
But, glory to the Army of the Potomac, not 
once are we beaten ! At every stand we repulse 
the foe with at least as bloody a slaughter as he 
gives, and only resume the line of march af'er 
hurling him clear from us. The last attack he 
makes, with the last rally of rebel strength and 
rebel desperation, is a great and decisive Union 
victory ! 

WHO SAVED THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC? 

Safety was brought out of ruin — retreat was 
turned into a change of base, resulting in a 
better position than before. Now, give him 
that fifty thousand men he was cheated out of — 
give him thirty-five thousand. Too late ! The 
sign which refused recruits and scorned Demo- 
crats has only just been taken down. Tha 
Army of the Potomac must march back as it 
best can ; must take ship and look after the 
safety of Washington. McClellan is deposed ! 
But no matter. Another star is rising. We 
will see what Pope can do. He despises spades. 
He knows how to steal chickens. McClellan 
had too much respect for hen-roosts. Fall in, 
boys, and the cry shall be — "Pope a-nd Pigs and 
Victory !" 

Let us go back and see how Washington got 
frightened and how McDowell was withheld 
from the business he was thrice sent upon. No 
sooner did McClellan resign the chief command 
than somebody in the War OSice cut the map 
of war into three departments. McClellan was 



given a very limited field, with the Army of the 
Potomac. All west of Knoxville was given to 
Halleek, who had taken Corinth by forced 
marches of a mile a day, and the free use of 
spades, and whose speed was not, therefore, to 
be feared. The intermediate space was alloted 
to Fremont. You see the old fallacy was again 
resuming its sway, and "the speedy downfall of 
the rebellion" a thing absolutely decided on at 
the War Office — the pursuit of the flying foe 
and his capture being a mere question «. f swift- 
ness. Presidential laurels, growing thick in 
Southern fields, must not be reaped by one of 
wrong politics. So Fremont was a second time 
brought out and put in training. In order to 
give him a command, to go, the Lord knows 
where, and do, the Lord knows what, the army 
of Banks was broken up, and Stonewall Jackson 
soon got back his valley again. 

All know how easily the Pathfinder lost his 
path among the gorges of the Mountain De- 
partment, and that in a wonderfully short time 
he brought chaos out of order. Under his 
skilful hand confusion was worse confounded 
than ever confusion was confounded before. 

The rebels gave him — , what Old Bullion 

never willingly gave him. Never mind it, Fre- 
mont ! your politics are faultless, if your tactics 
are a. muddle. Heed not your tumble. Up 
again, and take another. 

It seems to me that the " Conductors of the 
War" have not been happy in their selection of 
Generals to set ofi" against McClellan. 

The consequence, then, of giving Fremont a 
command, was to let loose Stonewall Jackson, 
whom McClc-llan had pretty well taken care of 
when he sent Banksup the Vall?;y with his thirty 
thousand men. Stonewall Jackson being at 
large, the consequence was that he occupied the 
attention of not only Banks, Shields, and Fre- 
mont, each with a separate command, trying to 
catch him, but occupied the attention of the 
War committee itself, and excited lively fears for 
the safety of Washington. To catch and de- 
stroy him was resolved on. McDowell, just on 
the march to join McClellan, is recalled, and 
sent after Jackson. McDowell begs to be al- 
lowed to go to Richmond, and do the important 
business of closing up the war in Virginia, and 
saving the Army of the Potomac ; or, begs at 
least to be sent where he can either catch Jack- 
son or drive him off from Richmond. If he 
must turn back from his advance upon the 
lions' den and go fox-hunting, he asks to 



go to the point where he may catch the 
beast by the nead, and not by the tail, 
or rather catch at the tip of the tail, as 
it turned out. His request was denied, and he 
was marched to a point where he arrived just in 
time to be too late. The prey had escaped. 
Here were Fremont, Shields and Banks, each 
with a separate army, with the troops garrison- 
ing Washington and the whole line of the Poto- 
mac, besides the noble army of McDowell — in 
all full a hundred thousand men — scattering up 
and down in the exciting but bootless sport of 
grabbing Jackson — who escapes after all, leav- 
ing the whole hundred thousand standing at a 
stand-still and looking each other fooMshly in 
the face — all this, that Fremont might win his 
Presidential spurs. 

Here, too, we have a specimen of that strategy 
which was set up against the well considered 
plans of McClellan. 

It is easily seen that the turning point of onr 
destiny was the breaking up of the army left 
with Banks to hold the Valley, in order to 
create a department for a political General, the 
idol of the radicals. The pledge to do this was 
wrung from the President, you may swear, by 
the same factious, noxious crew I have named. 

Having displaced McClellan, the conclave 
made up of the Secretary, the new General-in- 
Chief, and the conductors of the war, were 
bound to match him in strategy, or stand con- 
victed of a crime against the Union. We have 
seen how they prospered with Fremont. Hal- 
leek superseded him by Gen. Pope, and then 
Halleek, Stanton, and Pope together fought a 
nice little campaign o* their own, "short, sharp, 
and decisive," — but decisive the wrong way. 

McClellan was recalled just in time to receive 
within the forts of Washington the worn out 
remnant of his late splendid army. They had 
borrowed it of him for a while, and now re- 
turned it badly used up. 

The enemy were threatening Washington now 
in earnest. What was to be done ? Fremont 
had failed and Pope had failed— both entirely 
unexceptionable in their politics. I lave read 
that the President excused himself for restoring 
McClellan, by saying in extenuation of his 
error, that the soldiers would fight under 
McClellan, and would not fight under any other 
commander. I think the excuse has merit in it. 

He was restored just as our cause was at its 
last gasp. His name, his presence, riding 
along the lines— the sound of his yoice— were 



10 



all that was needed to make our battered forces 
the equals of the enemy's. McClellan has been 
accused of slowness in his movements. Within 
two days after the re-entry of the army within 
the Washington lines, he was in full march 
Northward to "meet the rebels, moving a disor- 
ganized army at the rate of seven miles a day. 
He overtook and beat the enemy at South 
Mountain. He forced them to stand and fight 
him at Antietain, where with numbers about 
equal to theirs, certainly not greater, he attacked 
them in a very strong position, and beat them 
fairly in fair pitched battle. He drove the ene- 
my out of Maryland. He crossed after them, 
but refused to attack them in the position they 
had chosen. He was requested by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to attack them without delay. 
(It is easy to give such orders.) He would not 
do it. They were in a position from which he 
knew they must soon retreat, and when they 
began to fall back he knew that by moving in 
lines parallel to their march he could be in 
Richmond a week at least before they could. 
So it eventuated. As the enemy moved, he 
moved, keeping always ahead of them, and 
closing up the gaps as they went. It was while 
he was thus pursuing them, and at the same 
time heading them, moving ten miles a day, 
forcing them into a sterile region where they 
could not subsist, which would oblige them to 
attack him in positions of his choosing, or dis- 
appear from Virginia, leaving it and the Confed- 
erate Capital in our hands— which even without a 
general engagement, an army corps could at 
any moment have taken and held. It was in 
this crisis— on the eve of a great battle, with 
the enemy out-generaled — crowded away from 
the point they would defend — in short, with Lee 
and his army wholly in our power — it was then 
that a stormy night witnessed the arrival of 
a swift messenger from Washington, announcing 
that the factious radicals had again prevailed — 
and a victorious General, in full tide of success, 
is again disgraced in face of his army ! And 
another chapter is added to the history of hu- 
man ingratitude. 

Nothing that has been alleged, nothing that 
has been concealed, nothing that it is possible 
to imagine, can justify such a deed. It is said 
that he would not fight just when, where and 
how his mortal foes in the War OfBce dictated. 
What was there so brilliant in the strategy of 
the Fremont, Pope, and Burnside campaigns to 
make us prefer the generalship of the War De- 



partment to that of the victor of Antietam ? 
Or had his former experience of their ability to 
keep his secrets from rebel ears been such as to 
lead him to explain his intended movements a 
second time ? 

It was a vile act ! It was a foul deed ! 

They were impatient were they ? What speed 
have they made since displacing him ? From 
the fourth of November till now, well nigh the 
fourth of April, what progress has that Army of 
the Potomac made ? Five months and no 
results, except that Burnside was sent to Fred- 
ericksburg, and came back short seven thousand 
men. Spades were in disgrace there, until or- 
dered to the front to bury fifteen hundred and 
twelve new made corpses ! 

And so Burnside was displaced for Hooker. 
Fremont failed. Pope failed, Burnside failed ; 
and yet all acted under the wise and particular- 
ly minute directions of the War Office, and the 
War Office was inspired by the Conduct of the 
War Committee, and the War Committee was 
inspired — by the spirit of the Devil of old. 

But we are now more than twelve months 
from the time when the radicals told us that an 
immediate movement by McClellan, or his im- 
mediate removal, was rendered imperatively 
necessary by the immense war expenditure — 
four millions a day, said they. But how sweet- 
ly patient have the dear souls become since the 
battle of Fredericksburg, near four months ago! 
Do they believe now in Virginia mud ? Do 
they believe now in the strength of the rebels ? 
Are they waiting for the spirit of the Lord or 
the sword of Gideon ? 

But the time has been improved, I believe, in 
" moralizing " the Army of the Potomac. The 
Generals of that army, incorporated into its 
very being by the organizing genius 
that created it, were a galaxy of veritable 
heroes. They were embraced with McClellan 
in the affections of the soldiers. It would not 
suit the views of the radicals to let them con- 
tinue with their men. McDowell was displaced. 
Porter was displaced, degraded, and, with his 
honors thick upon him, a hero of triumphantly 
established fame, was dismissed from the army 
of the Union. Heintzelman was transferred 
away. At one stroke the gallant Sumner 
and Franklin were cut off. Burnside, having 
been used as a tool, was flung by. Of those 
great Generals hardly one remains. Stevens, 
Kearney, Reno, Richardson and Mansfield were 
killed, leading their men. It is well for them 



11 



they fell when they did, for the revolutionary 
tribunal would have never permitted them to re- 
tain commands in that army : it loved them too 
well. Such disgrace as a vile faction could in- 
flict would surely have been their fate, had they 
survived. Hooker remains, nominally the chief; 
but he knows that a Turkish pasha of the olden 
time, or a general-in-chief under the French 
revolutionary government, had as sure a hold 
upon his own head as he has on his. 

Yet, notwithstanding all this, the Army of 
the Potomac to-day, with all the willful con- 
stancy of a bereaved lover, concentrates its 
whole affection, all its hopes, dreams, memories, 
and longings, on that man McClellan. Without 
him, that army, if properly led, is a hundred 
thousand strong ; with him, it is a hundred and 
fifty thousand strong. 

That army has a right to its commander. In 
right of its services, in right of its hardships 
and sufferings, in right of its killed and wound- 
ed, in right of its grief and its injuries, in right 
of its battles and victories, in right of its devo- 
tion and glory, it claims and demands its chosen 
General. 

Now, you and I, at this distance from the seat 
of war, may fall into delusions respecting the 
quality of commanders ; but this army that 
worships McClellan — this semi-popular assem- 
blage, all soldier and all citizen, composed of 
our most patriotic and intelligent men — this 
vast jury of experts, who have summered and 
wintered with him, marched and fought with 
him, tried him by the hot ordeal of war — this 
army does know if he be a General or no Gener- 
al. Their testimony must seal your mouths and 
mine. We must bow to it. Within two days, 
two regular officers, of intelligence, fresh from 
the Rappahannock, have told me — the one, that 
the army were infatuated in the worship of their 
hero to the verge of folly ; the other, that there 
was but one sentiment in all that army, and that 
was for McClellan. 

Thus have I in some measure traced the chain 
of calamity that has befallen our cause from 
the machinations of that factious opposition 
which, as I said, has dared to choose a time of 
war and of the nation's sore trouble to revolu- 
tionize its own party and revolutionize the 



country. And now to those of the Democratic 
party I would say, had you not at first too 
cordially supported the Government in all it 
did, right or wrong, and had you not afterwards 
based your opposition on comparatively unim- 
portant issues, like arrests and so forth, or upon 
issues that implied an opposition to the war 
itself, like matters of taxation, draft, conscrip- 
tion, and confiscation, and had you watched the 
conduct of the war, to criticise its management 
and progress, your opposition would have been 
proper, useful, healthy, and perfectly legitimate. 
The result of such an opposition would have 
been to supersede alike the half-sympathy with 
the rebellion which in its absence has arisen, 
and, what is more important far, would have 
superseded also that factious opposition to the 
Government which the absence of a proper 
opposition on your part has allowed to spring 
up within the bosom of the other party, to rend 
its vitals and the vitals of the country. 

You should bear in mind that anything on 
your part, looking like a factious opposition to 
the war itself, will furnish the radicals (who 
now rule us) with a pretext for abandoning the 
contest, and submitting to a dissolution of that 
Union which you love far more dearly than they. 
You are coming into power. Prepare yourbelves 
to lift up the banner of the Union when it falls 
from their imbecile grasp, to hold it high aloft 
with the nerve only Democrats possess, and de- 
fend it against all comers, come they from the 
North or the South, I know, and you know, 
that had the rebellion found you in power, you 
would have fought out the issue, without armis- 
tice or truce, or attempt to conciliate traitors 
in arms. 

Believe me, the red, white, and blue becomes 
your political complexion better than the butter- 
nut tawny. Take no position that is unnatural 
to you, or that you are not prepared to hold to 
the end. If you do otherwise, the party that 
will arise on the downfall of the present domi- 
nating faction, to guide the triumphant destinies 
of a re-established Union, whatever may be its 
principles, will bear upon its front some other 
title than the time-honored name of "Demo- 
cratic." 



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